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It would be a great perversion of every principle of equity, if
the plaintiffs' claim Were not sustained.
It is ordered and decreed that the defendant, Edward R. Laurens,
do account for and pay over to the plaintiffs, who are the trustees
of the marriage settlement of William Simons and Catharine his
wife, all the moneys which have come into his hands as late Master
in 'Equity, which -may be due to the said Catharine Simons from
the estate of Lydia Lucas, and that Master Tupper state the accounts.
It'is fuither.ordered and decreed, that the South-western Rail
Road' Bank do deliver up to the said trustees, the, said certificate
of City 5 per cent. ftock, and the said certificate of State three per
cent. stock mentioned and described in the 'plaintiffs' bill; and that
they account for the dividehds 'they may have received thereon, (if
they have received any;) and that all transfers and assignments of
the said certificat&s be setzaside and canceled.:.
It is furthef" ordered and decreed, that the defendants pay the
costs.

Petegru'and ancike; for Appellants.
Afemminger and J erv , for Respondents.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISION.

Court of Common Pleas of -England;H7aryj Term, 185-1.
TAYLOR VS. BEST AND OTHERS.
1. A councillor of legation of a foreign sovereign, who has the charge of the executive of the saidlegdtioni subject to the directions of the minister plenipotentiary,
and who acts as charg6 d'affaires in the absence of such minister, is. "a public
minister of a foreign prince" within the meaning of the 7 Ann. c. 12, and entitled as such to the privileges of an ambassador.
'18 Jurist, 402. We have'inserted this case at length, on account of its bearing
on the recent arrest of the French Consul in California.
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2. An ambassador, who voluntarily appears to an action brought against him and
other defendants in this country as joint contrators, and who thus submits to
the jurisdiction of the Court, is not entitled to have the proceedings set asiae, or
the action stayed against him, on the ground of his being privileged, as an ambassador, from suit, if no step has been takea by the plaintiff in the action to interfere.with his person or property.
3. Quoere, if an ambassador can, in invitum, be sued in this country, when process
is not directed against his person, or such goods of his as are connected with his
comfort and dignity as ambassador?
4. Semble, where the privilege of an ambassador attaches, it is not lost by the ambassador being engaged in trade.

This was a rule calling on the plaintiff to show cause why all
further proceedings in this action should not be stayed, or why the
name of Charles Drouet, one of the defendants, should not be
struck out of the record, and why all the proceedings in the action
should not be set aside. It appeared that the defendant Drouet
was sued as one of the directofs of a company called "The' Royal
Nassau Sulphate of Barytes Mining Company," which was a company en commandit6, and in which the deposits on the shares were,
according to the prospectus to be returned in full, without any
deduction for preliminary expenses, in the event of the non-prosecution of the company. This event having happened, the plaiitiff,.
4ho had taken shares in the company, biought this action against.
four of the directors, including the defendant Dronet, to recover
the deposit money paid by him on his shares, amounting altogether
to 2501. The several defendants appeared separately to the action,
the defendant Drouet authorizing his attorney to request the plaintiff's attorney to send the writ to him for an undertaking to appear,
in order to avoid personal service, which proceeded to issue joined,
and to a rule for a special jury, applied for on behalf of the defendant Drouet. In this stage of the proceedings the defendant
Drouet, who had been abroad after he had appeared to the action,
returned to this country, and applied before a judge at chambers to
stay the proceedings in the action on the ground of hii being a
foreign minister, and therefore privileged from being sued in this
country. The learned Judge referred the question to the full
Court, and this rule was afterwards obtained. The affidavit on
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which the rule was obtained, described the defendant Drouet as
being "the duly appointed councillor of legation of his Majesty the
King of the BelgiAs, at the Court of St. James, and that he has
full charge of the executive, of the said legation, subject to the
directions of his Excellency M. Van de Weyer, the minister plenipotentiary, and that in the absence of M. Van de Weyer, he is required to act, and has acted, as char'ge d'affaires, to his said Majesty at the said Court." The affidavit also stated, by way of explanation, for having pleaded to the action, that it was a mistake,
and was made without authority by the defendant's attorney, who
had applied to, and consulted on the subject, a friend of the defendant during his absence on the continent.
Montague Ohambers, Q. C., and -Pearsonshowed cause.--Tis,
rule must be discharged. Though an ambassador is privileged from
arrest, and other such process as may interfere with his dignity-and
comfort in this country, he has no privilege, either at common law
or under the stat. 7 Ann. c. 12, which can entitle him to stay proceedings in the civil courts. This defendant does not, howeve,
show that he is entitled to the privileges of an.ambassador. It is
not alleged in the affidavit that M. Van de Weyer is absent, and it
is only in his abscence that. this defendant claims to act as chargd
d'affaires to the King of the-Belgians. [Jervia, C. .- He shown,
I think, that he is a public minister of his sovereign, and that is
sufficient.] It is submitted that the expression "public minister,"
in the stat. 7 Ann. c. 12, means a chief officer in the embassy,, and
does not comprise a person like the present defendant, who has only
the charge of the"executive, under the directions of the ambassador.
However as ambassador or minister there is no such privilege as is
now claimed. An ambassador is not altogether exempt from the
ordinary tribunals of the country to which he is accredited. Vattel, b. 4, c. 7; Te Emperor of Brazil v. Robineon, 5 Dowl. 522.
In Molloy, De Jure Maritimo, c. 10, s. 16, it is said that the moveable goods of an ambassador, which are accounted an accession to
his person, cannot be seized on, and that when he hath contracted
a debt, he is to be called upon kindly, and if he refuses, then letters
of request are to go to his master, so that at last that course may
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be taken with him as with debtors in another territory; but it is
there stated, that an ejectment had been brought and left at the
house of the ambassador, and it was allowed good, and conceived
no breach of their privilege, in the case of Iionsieur Colbert, for
York House, (Mich. 28 Car. 2, in Banc. Reg.); and reference
is Also given to Coke, 4 Inst. c. 26. vol. 153, where Lord Coke,
after stating that an ambassador may be made amenable for
crimes committed by him in this country, says, "and so of
contracts that be. good jure gentium, he must answer here."
[Aaule, T.-Do you say that an ejectment may be brought now, as
in the case of M. Colbert?] It is not, perhaps, necessary to go to
that extent; but supposing this company, of which the defendant
is a director, to have some property not required for the ambassador in his character as ambassador, it is apprehended that to that
extent an execution would be good. Although the person of the
ambassador is to be free, and also such goods of his as aro necessary for his dignity, and maintaing his position as minister, yet, if
he enters into trade, his trade goods are, it is submitted, liable to
be taken by the process of the Courts to satisfy his creditors.
Vattel (b. 4, c. 8, s. 114) says, "But this exemption cannot extend
to such property as evidently belongs to the ambassador under any
Should a minster,
other relation than that of minister. .... ..
in any branch of
embark
case),
the
been
often
therefore, (as has
commerce, all the effects, goods, money and debts, active and
passive, which are connected with his mercantile concerns, and likewise all contests and law-suits to which they give rise, fall under
the jurisdiction of the country; and although, in consequence of
the minister's independency, no legal process can, in those law-suits,
be directly issued against his person, he is, nevertheless, by the
seizure of the effects belonging to his commerce, indirectly corn-.
pelled, to plead in his own. defence." The stat. 7 Ann. c. 12, does
not extend the privilege; it is only declaratory of the common law.
Triquet vs. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478. The sections of the statute of
Anne which relate at all to the present case, are the third and fifth.
The third section provides, "that all writs and processes whereby
the person of any ambassador or public minister of any foreign
prince or state; authorized and received as such by her Majesty, her
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heirs or successors, or the domestic servants of any such ambassador or other public minister, may be arrested, imprisoned, or his or
their goods or chattels may be distrained, seized, or attached, shall
be deemed and adjudged to be utterly mull and voia ;" and the fifth
section declares, "thit no merchant or other trader whatsoever within
the description of any.of the statutes .against bankrupts, who hath or
shall put himself- into the service of any such ambassador or public
mistel, shall -have or take any maimer of benefit by this act."
The act gives proteetion only against process which' affects the
person or goods of an ambassador, and excepts the case -f traders;
[As to the nature of the privilege, the. following authorities were
also cited :--2 AGiotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. 2, c. 1, s. 9;
Wicquefort, (Ab.), - "Embassador ; " c. 27; Bynkershock De Foro
Legatorum, c., 16.; Burlamaqui, part 4, e. 15, s. 12, sub s. 8;
.Pikngton-vs..Stanhl e, 2 Vein. 317; ,vans vs. Hige, 2 Str.
797; and Widh6re vs. Alvarez, cited in Evans vs. Higgs. lb.
It may be important that the plaintiff should establish his debt, for
after judgment he may. apply to- the King -of, the -Belgians for
justice, and his Mijesty may compel the defendant to. do' what is
right; or, for- aught that appears to the contrary, the defenidant
may have land orgoods not necessary for his convenience as ambassadori and which would therefore not be exempt from execution.2" v'ello. vs.-Toogood, 1 B. & Cr. 554. At all events, there- is no
authority for saying that an action will not lie against an ambassadoi or that the -Courts have ever interfered by granting a stay of
proceedings in the action, especially in a case like, the present,
where the defendant has voluntarily:appeared,, Jn Rothechild vs.
!l e Queen of Portugal,3 Y. & C. 594 it was held;'that a foreign
prince who comes voluntarily as a suitor ihto a court bf law in
England, becomes subject, as, to all maiters connected with that
suit, to- the jurisdiction of the Court; and -in Evan vs. ffiggs,-2
Str. 797 the application was to discharge the defendant out of
execution. [It was also contended, that as the' defendant Drouet
was a directoi of the company-a trading company-he was a
trader, and therefore within the fifth section of stat. 'r Ann: c. 12,
and not privileged. Viveask vs. Be ker, 3 . & S. 284; "fopkin8
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vs. De Robeck, 3 T. R. 79; In re The Madrid and -alencia
_ailway Company, ex arte James, 19 L. J., Ch. 260.
Byles, Sergt., for the defendant Best, and fannen, for another
of the defendants, severally argued against the rule, contending
that the privilege from all suit did not exist in the case of ambassadors, nor were all their goods protected; citing Calvin's case, 7
Rep. 1; The Duke of Brunswick vs. The Zing of Ranover, 6
Beav. 1; Wadsworth vs. -The Queen of iSpain, 20 L. J., Q. B.,
492; 16 Jur. 164.; 1 Wheat. 279; Kluber's Droit des gens de
l'Europe, part 2, lib. 2, c. 2, s. 210; and Sheppardvs. Baillie, 6 T. R.
327.
Willes, in support of the rule.-With respect to M. Drouet being
entitled to thie privileges of an ambassador, it appears that he is
appointed councillor of the legation, and acts as charg6 d'affaires
in the absence of the minister plenipotentiary. [Jervis, C. J.You need not argue that point, as we are satisfied that M.'Drouet
is a public minister within the meaning of the statute of Anne.]
Then he is privileged, from this suit, and is entitled to have this rule
made absolute. This is an action in which the proceeding is in
personam, and is not a mere proceeding in rem, but which property
.of the defendant within the territory is attached, in order to found
jurisdiction against a foreigner, as is done in Holland, Spain,
France and Scotland. The distinction is pointed out in Story's
Confl. Laws, s. 549. The authorities which have been cited, as.
showing that an action against an ambassador may be maintained,
refer to proceedings in rem, and are only applicable to places where
such means of proceeding exist. There is no analogy between them
and the present case. It is the law of nations that the jurisdiction
of the courts of the country to which an ambassador is sent, is
altogether ousted as regards the person and goods of such ambas-"
dor; (Vattel, b. 4, c. 8) ;- and where there is, therefore, no means
of proceeding in rem, there is no jurisdiction to justify a proceeding against an ambassador. What is said by Coke in the passage
cited from the 4 Inst. is unsupported by all the writers of authority.
It is said that this defendant is a trader by reason of his being a
member of this company, and that he is, therefore, not privileged;
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but though in that case proceedings might be had in rem against
his mercantile goods in countries where such proceedings in rem
can be adopted, yet that would not justify a,
proceeding inpersonam,
such as thisaction is. [Maule, I.-His being engaged in trade is
matter entirely between him knd the King of' the Belgians, or bet een this country and his Majesty.] In .Doe d. Leigh vs. Boe,
8 M 4 W. 579, where an action of ejectment had been served an
the Board of.Ordnance, the Court of Exchequer, on motion made
on -half oft the Crown, set aside the declaration and stayed the
proceedings;" [M zule, 3.-That was not in respect of any personal
privilege; it was because ejectment cannot be maintained against
the Crown.
rlliam, J., referred to Coin. Dig., tit. "Ambassadoi," B., where it is said, 'An arrest, and bail bond given upon
it, shall beavoided upon metion '.citing-2 Mod. 288. What is. a
plaint to do, when an ambassadbr is-i co contractor ?] It is submitted that he ought to sue only the other co-contractors. [Vervi,
C. -here the defendant authorized the appearance to be entered,
and attorned to the jurisdiction. How can it .be now said by him
that the action is not to go, on,?] This is a state privilege which
belongs- to the King, his master, and cannot be waived by the
ambassador, and therefore entering an a ppearance is no waiver in
suoch case. -Triquetvs. Bath, 8 Burr. 1478; Barbuit's case,
Cae. t. Talb. 282, where Talbot, C., said, "And if the foundation
of- this privilege is for the sake of the prince by whom an ambassador is. sent, and for thesake--of the business he is to do, it is
impossible that he can renounce such privilege and protection;"
Bynkershock's De Fore, Legatorum, o. 22. [Maule, J.-It does
not follow, that because the action goes on, there will-be any interference with the person of the ambassador.] The-issuing of the
writ-against him is a molestation. Gibbons vs. Voulilon, 8 0. B.,
48-. Gur adv. v*lt.
* an. 31.-Jmvis, Q. J.-In this case, which was argued yesterday, the Court took time to consider the arguments which were
adduced, and having so.done, I am of opinion that the rule ought
to be discharged. There is no doubt in this case that the applicant, M. Drouet, fills the character of minister, to which the
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privilege contended for attaches; and I think it is equally clear
that what has been urged by Mr. Pearson has no application whatever in a case liKe this-namely, that if the privilege attach, as it
undoubtedly does attach, to the character of minister, in the case
of a minister it is not interfered with or abandoned by the circumstance of trading, as would be the case if the claim was set up in
respect of being in the service of the ambassador, within the provisions of the statute. If an ambassador or minister violates the
character in which *heis delegated to this country, by entering into
commercial transactions, that is a question between the country to
which he is sent and-the country from which he is sent, but he does
not thereby lose any privilege to which he may be entitled, the
privilege being a general privilege, and the limitation attached to
the privilege by reason of trading- being confined by the statute of
Anne to the case of the servant of the ambassador. I am reminded
that the case reported and referred to-Baruit'8case, in thetime of
Chancellor Talbot-is an authority on that subject. Adnitting,
therefore, that the applicant is a person entitled to the general
privilege, which he has not lost by any trading speculations into
which he may have entered, the question is, whether he is entitled,
under all the circumstances, to the privilege which he now claims.
No case has been cited to show that not only no process against the
person or the goods can be available against the perhon or goods of
an ambassador or minister, but that an application in the present
form, namely, an- application to stay all the proceeedings-ig available in the courts of this country. On the contrary, on an examination of what can be found upon the subject, it would seem that
in the case of servants--and the same principle must apply with
reference to principal officers-the practice has been, not to stay all
proceedings, but to relieve the person~of the servant of the ambassador from the vexation of service or of bail; and the applications
bave hitherto been, so far as I can -nderstand them, to discharge
the arrest, where the party has been arrested on entering a common
appearance.
The case referred to in the course of the argument by my Brother
Williams, cited in Comyn's Digest, and reported in 2 Mod. (which,
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in fact, is 8 Mod.), .Viz., the case of Cro88e vs. Talbot, 8 Mod. 288,
recognizes the old principle. That case was a motion on behalf of
the defendant to set aside a bail bond given upon his arrest, and
that common bail might be accepted for him, and he obtained a
-rule to show cause; and the rule was ultimately discharged, upon
.the .ground- thot he did not bring himself strictly within the privi.lege.as the servant of an ambassador. " The Couft-held he ought to
b a domestic servant; and really exercise the duties of .his office;
the being a mere-npminal servant was not suffcient; and they dis;.,
and, the reporter adds-"A great many cases
charged the
have since been.dete mined upon the same principle, but it was in
those cases held. that the idea of a domestic servant.was not confined to hislivingf1i the foreign minister's house, provided he. is a
real. servant, -nd actually, perferms the- service." Therefore the
,reporter, adds, go. far as his knowledge -went, that. a great many
casesjhad ,been~detekmined-in the form of ,that application, which
.applicition was ot to stay all proceedings, but to discharge the
:bailbond on.enteifihg a common- appeirance, so as to allow the pro,ceedings -to go: 'u:
.- I-mention this merely, without reference to the
princip6-,of,
the.case;.but, as to the form of application.
,general
.There is no case.that has been produced to the Court of an applica*tion. to stay proceedings where the personal.liberty of the applicant
has not been interfered with.; and further, I am aware of no case
in which an, action -having been brought against several defendants
-after the case has advanced,,as this has, up to the period of trial, it
has. been allowed, upon the application of one defendant, to stay all
proceedings; because if that were. so, it would necessarily follow
that .all the other defendants would have been put to considerable
expense.to. no..purpose, for the proceedings would have to be commenced de novo, and what- hos been expended in the progress of
,the suit would be utterly useless. At all events, it is sufficient to
say Inam no'aware.in my practice of any such application having
been made. But without considering the form of the motion, it
seems to me, under the' circumstances, that the rule ought to be
discharged upon the merits of the case. It is an action against
four defendants; the writ is sued out against Drouet as one of the
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joint contractors. There is no doubt the plantiff was bound in the
first instance to sue all, or he would have been subject to a plea in
abatement, and the other defendants would have contested the point
of jurisdiction without minding whether Drouet was the subject of
the suit or not. The writ being issued, nothing is done to interfere with the free exercise of the minister's functions, or with his
comfort or dignity in this country; but knowing or apprehending
a writ is to be issued, he gives instructions to an attorney, in whom
he has confidence, to write to the attorney for the plaintiff to ask
if a writ is to be issued; and if it is, then begging that that writ
may be sent to him; therefore soliciting the action against him, and
entering voluntarily-an appearance; thus voluntarily submitting to
the jurisdiction of the Court. Now, it seems to me, that under
these circumstances he cannot now be allowed to complain that a
suit has been instituted against him; and I think, by analogy, if it
be necessary, from what has been cited from the various jurists,
this proceeding might be sustained. It is contended, and perhaps
it is undoubted, that an ambassador or a minister has a privilege
from suit, or at all events from such suits as ultimately result in the
taking of his person, or of his goods necessary to his estate or.comfort; and in invitum, or involuntarily, you cannot compel him to
enter into litigation in a country in which he is resident; but it is
admitted by all foreign jurists, that where suits can be founded
without attacking the personal liberty or comfort, or interfering
with the personal privileges of the individual, you may proceed.
And various passages were cited from the works referred to yesterday to show, that in countries where the civil law prevails, and
where you can found your jurisdiction by proceeding in rem in the
first instance, the action may proceed where there are houses or
land that are immoveable, and may be taken to found the juris-"
diction. So also where there are moveable goods unconnected with
the comfort or dignity of the minister, these can be taken to found
the jurisdiction, and the suit may proceed. And when you consider what is the effect of the proceedings, and what ultimately may
be done if the minister so chooses, there is little distinction between
that proceeding and the present; because, although it is perfectly
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true that in countries where the civil law prevails, you may proceed
by attachment or writ, and thus incidentally establish the means of
litigation between the parties without interfering with the person of
the defendant, yet if the defendant choosesi-for'the pupose of protecting his goods or investigating the question, to appear, Iis suit,
-whi was originally in re,is cohverted into a suit in 3petoam
-adit is A-daily pmctice in.Scotland .that goodswliich originally
were taken for the mere purpose of founding the jirisdiction, have
been-held as a pledge or security for the fruits -of the .*dgment, if
the judgment was ultimately obtained. If, thereforei you have -a
writ in Holland or -elsewhere, and commence -your suit by taking
goods to found the jurisdiction upon, the minister if hV pleases,
may -come in and convert the suit into a suit in ps roxm, and in
that case cannot object to any exercise of authority against him.
Itseems :to be clear from the works referred to, that twe seams no
distinction between that case and the case at present before us,
where the writisa-ot even served upon the party; wAre -o step is
taken which interferes with the -dignity of his opositiod, or st all to
disturb his comfort; 'ut w ere inerelytipon his own aplideion the
writ is issued, to which-he voluntarily appears, und volintarily snb-mits to the /jhrisdiction of the Court. It seems to me, on, that
ground, this rule -ought to be discharged. I-am not at -all affected
by what was urged strongly by Mr. Willes, that this being a privilege of his master or sovereign, it cannot be abandoned; because,
when you come to- examine the authorities referred to on the matter, they are, not that the party may not submit to the jurisdietioni
for the purpose of' having the matter in dispute settled or investigated between the -contracting parties, but that the security of the
character and the persoi of the - ambassador, or -the protection his goods necessary to his state -and comfort, cannot be abandoned
-byany voluntary act of his own; and by interfering with the person of the -ambassador, and taking the goods necessary to his position, you are attacking the privilege of the master who sends him
to this country. That is not this case; -for aught that appears
-here, this party was so sued for the purpose of ascertaining the
liability of others, he being a necessary party. Non cofistat, for
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aught that appears, anything would have gone on here, except to
judgment, for the purpose of enforcing against the other defendants
their liability to the plaintiff. If, as 'the fruits or the result of such
judgment, a writ of fieri facias or capias had been issued to interfere with the goods or person of the ambassador or minister, then
the statute of Anne would have come in, and this Court would have
interfered. It seems to me, under the circumstances, the Court is
not called upon to interfere; the party has submitted to the jurisdiction-in fact has courted it; and therefore cannot have the
relief he seeks.
MAULE, J.-I
think, upon the ground that M. Drouet, who appliesfor this rule, has voluntarily appeared to the action, and has
allowed it to 'go on to a certain stage, the application cannot be
granted without prejudice to the interests of the other defendantd,
as well as of the plaintiff. On that ground I think this application
ought to fail. -It is a grave question whether an ambassador or
public minister, which M. Drouet undoubtedly is, is so protected by
his privilege as that he is not liable to any suit in any maiter instituted in the dominions of this country, supposing him to object to
the jurisdiction of time and place. That is not decided by any legal
determination in this country; nor indeed, as far as judicial determinations go, do we.find that it has been so decided elsewhere.
With respect to the case of an application for a special remedy
being given: by the third section of the statute of Anne to servants
of a minister or ambassador, where the servant has been sued, there
are cases in which he has been discharged upon giving common bail;
that seems the extent of relief in those cases that he has asked for,
and it has been granted to him: whether, if he had asked for more,
it would have been granted, does not appear; probably it would not.
But then there is a great distinction between an ambassador and a'
domestic servant of an ambassador: an ambassador is a person of
privilege; the privilege of the domestic servant of an ambassador
is the privilege, not of the domestic servant, but of the ambassador;
it is (I refer to recent decisions here-the recent cases clearly show
that) because the arrest of the person of the domestic servant of the
ambassador might interfere with the comfort and state of the am-
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bassador himself, that the serv~nt has the relief; where that is not
-interfered with at all, then the ambassador is not interfered with by
the suit; and the servant's privilege does not extend to such a case,

for the servant has no privilege except subordinate to and arising
out of the.privilege of, the ambassador. I tlink the cases do not
determine the point, and it is .one -fit to be properly ahd gravely
considered, whenever the question shall properly arise, whether an
ambassador is to be liable to be sued by process not attacking his
person, and not attacking his goods, where by such a process he is
to be brought into a Court of this country unwillingly, and to have
Is right- determhed-it may be, to a v-ry great amount, and perhaps even to an interference with his comfort. For a man who has
a large and important law-suit cannot stand.by and take no care or
thought of it, aund -allowit to be a binding decision upon him; and
therefore it is a qabstion -whether the -privilege is -not quite as exeosive jw Blackstone, J., and some other authorities would show.
That is not necessary to be decided here, because, whatever the
extent of the privilege may be, I think, in a case Where a defendant,
who is sued with several other persons, chooses voluntarily to appear
and to allow the sit to-go on-to a certain'advanced stage'without
interposing, and where it does not appear that the plaintiff has any
intention to interfere with the person or pr9perty of the applicant,
but where the suit may be carried out to its full effect, and have
entire execution without the defendant being at all interfered with
either in person, or property, the rule as to-privilege ought not to
extend, the privilege of the ambassador having been put an end to
by the voluntary act of the defendant under the peculiar circumstauces of the case. I therefore agree with the Lord Chief Justice
that the rule must be discharged.
CaESSWELL and WniAms, JJ., conourred.-RBue.discharged.

VOSE vs. ALLEN.

United State8 District Court, NDew-York.

In Admiralty,

(February,1854.)
FRANCIS VOSE VS. THOMAS ALLEN, OWNER OF THE BARK MAJESTIC.
1. A bill of lading was signed by the master of a bark at Belfast, acknowledging
to have received 220 tons bf pig iron, to be delivered at the port of New York.
About fifty tons of the iron was lost at New York, while the bark was discharging
her cargo, by the breaking and sinking of the pile wharf or bridge upon which
the iron had been improperly placed; and for this loss the bark was libeled in
Admirilty; hdd, that the iron was lost before delivery to the consignees by the
carrier, and that by the terms of the bill of lading the bark was liable for such
loss.
2. The liability of a carrier under a bill of lading continues until the merchandise
is safely delivered to the consignee.at the port of discharge, or placed in'such a
situation there as to be equivalent to a safe delivery, and the carrier is not discharged of the custody of the goods until this is done.
3. In regard to foreign voyages, under a bill of lading in gie usual form,
rier is not bound to make a personal delivery of the merchandise to
signee, but it is sufficient if he lands it at the proper wharf, and in the
manner, and gives reasonable notice to the consignee thereof. Such
with such notice, is equivalent to a personal delivery.

the carthe conordinary
landing,

The opinion of the court was delivered by
INGERSOL, J.-The libel in this case is filed by Francis Vose,
Charles L. Perkins, and John B. Kettell, against Thomas Allen,
the owner- of the British bark Majestic, for the recovery of the value
of a quantity of pig iron, shipped-at Belfast, Ireland, by Ralston,
Goodwin & Co., on board the Majestic, to be carried to the port of
New York, and there, at said port, the dangers of the seas only excepted, to be delivered to the libelants or their assigns. About fifty
tons of the iron, of the two hundred and twenty tons so shipped,
was lost at the port of New York, while the Majestic was dischargink
her cargo, by the breaking and sinking of a pile wharf or bridge
upon which the iron was placed when being landed from the bark,
and the claim of the libelants is, that it was so lost before it was delivered to them by the carrier, according to the terms of the bill of
lading executed at the time the iron was shipped at Belfast.
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The bill of lading which bears date the 26th day-of April, 1852,
and,,was'signed by the master of-the Majestic, at- Belfast, acknowledges that Ralston, Goodwin &.-Co. had shipped in good order on
board the Majestic, then lying in the harbor of Belfast, two hundred
and t*wnty:t0iis of'pig iron, t6 be delivered in the like good order
at the port of iew York, the dangers of the seas only excepted,
.unto the libe.ants. or to their assigns, he or. they paying freight at
-th6rate-stated:- in the bill of lading. The bill of lading- is in'the
•ordi#4ry fokii, With the'.addiffon of the foll6wing clause, inserted in
them
tin
1"Ieronnamely--"Iro
to be discharged by the consignees in five days after the vessel's arrival at New York, or pay
demurrage of $25 a day after that tinIe. The above clause means
.fve working days from the time. the vessel:is ready to discharge."
The libelaufts claimh that by vii-tue"of this'additional clause 'in the
aeh bOf'tlieIll 6f lading, the"' have more rights in reference to
the unlading of the iron than they otherwise would have. had; that
'by 'this .aftional ,1ausethey had five working days, from.the time
the vessel,-wYas. rea dy.to discharge .to .unload the -iron themselves;
-hatthey-ha& a.-tight,'by-ther stipulation'contained in this'additibhal
clause, at any time withiii'such five working days, to designate and
select the wharf at which the iron 'should be discharged.; that before
the expiration of the five days the iron was lost; that the wharf 'at
which the crgo.,oft.the Majestic 'was discharged was selected'by the
,,captain of .tbo hark,. :wthout their- concurrence; that they requested
the captain tedischarge at-another wharf, which, though' it"*as o6*cupi'Qd at thI.tihe,, would have been vacafit W)efore the expirati6n of
"such. five worlmn'da.ys, and that; therefore, no discharge of the iron
-at any wharf saebted bythe' captainwithout their 6ncurrence,"iith.in
such five workihg. days,' although the 6aptain inay have given'thein
notido of-suoh icharge' would 'in
law.be deemed a dallvei* "of the
ironto -thbm according.to 'he 'terms of*the-'oitract, as 'eiessed in
the bill oflading::
.
".'
The hecessities ofthe casei as 'I view it, upon the evidence as exhibited on-the trial, do-not requiie the expression'of an opinion upon
this claim"as.made 'by the libelants. ' The consideration ofit, therefore, will be waived, and the case be considered as it would :be; were
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not this additional clause appended to the bill of lading; and, in
conformity with the claim of the respondent, that will be viewed as
the contract of the parties, which is imported by a bill of lading in
the ordinary form, governed by the same legal rules in its construetion as would govern the instrument upon which the libel is founded,
were not the additional clause appended to it.
In order to come to a correct result, it is necessary to ascertain
what the facts in the case 6re.; what the law is on the subject of
the liabilities of common carriers of goods for hire-when they begin, how long they continue, and .when they cease, or when the carrier discharges himself from the custody of the -goods in his character of common carrier, and then .apply such law to such facts in the
case.

The Majestic having, on the 26th of April, 1852, received at Belfast the 220 tons of pig iron for the purposes named in the bill. of
lading, soon thereafter sailed for her port of destination. 'She arrived in the harbor of New York on Sunday, the 20th day of June, of
the same -year. The vessel was consigned to Edmiston &Brothers,
agents of the ship. The iron was consigned to the libelants. On
Monday, the 21st of June, the captain of the Majestic reported himself to the libelants, and inquired of them where he was to discharge.
The libelants sent their clerk to find a vacant berth. No berth vacant could be found on the North River below pier No. 39. The libelants requested that she might discharge somewhere between Washington Market and the Battery, and named piers No. 8 and No.9;
but neither of these piers was then vacant. The captain, on Tuesday,
the 22d of June, hauled the vessel into pier No.39, which was not
between Washington Market and the Battery. On the 22d of June,
Edmiston & Brothers wrote to the libelants, informing them that
the Majestic was berthed at pier No. 39 North River, and was pre-"
pared to discharge her cargo, and requested them to furnish tlhem
(Edmiston & Brothers) with a permit for the iron, that the vessel
might commence landing it as early as possible. The Custom House
permit was furnished by the libelants and sent to Edmiston & Brothers on Wednesday, the 23d of June, and on Thursday, the 24th, the
captain began to discharge the cargo. Pier No. 39 was about 300
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feet long. The outer end of it, for about 40 feet, was solid. The
remainder *as what is called a bridge pier, built on piles. The vessel continued 't6 discharge the iron on the pile part of the ibdr, maut
about 11 o'clock A. M. on Friday, at which time the flrsf Iltenant
of police, of the 5th ward, in which ward pier 89 wai, c~eeving 0e
greater quantity of iron on the pier thpn he thought wii Safe, Apoke
to the assistant dock-master, and told him to go on Eb~di
d'order
them to stop 'discharging. 'The assistant dock-inaster '! e&ately
went on board; and ordered those on b.oard not to land .aiynor"
iron on the pir.. They forza timelceased. On the ate6non df the
same day the- dock-master noticed that they were again ischarging, and 'being of 'opinion 'that the pier, with the 4uiMity of irofi
then on it, was not safe, ordered those on board to knock,off, and
to cease dischirging. "Upon this order being.giveij, those oh board
again stopped. "On the morning of Saturday' the g6t
e
went to dischaikgiig the iron, and continued i11 aVouE 11oo'elock;
when, foin the weight of the iron'on the piei, -the pier trdke- d~'n,
and the iro
fiuoi
it was preipitated into tew ter a"oufi y
tons of it totally lost. At the time* the pibr bro e.own, .ere
were about 150 tons of the iron upon it, and placed in'si'h manner
that it caused the break/rag of the pier. Oi Fiidaye,'tlw 25th day
of"Jin, ini
the "forenoon', a wiitten notice wit 'sent tb t hb office of
libelants"by Edmiston & Brothers, notifyiig "t]iem that the pier,
upon which a portion of the iron had bebn "discharged,was supposed
to be in danger, and requesting 'thei to remove it. .At6r'
this notice, although none of the ikon was removed from the pier, an additional quantity was discla iea from the vessel and placea 'dn the
pier, until 1,56 tons had been'there placed, when the pier fell. At
the time the order was given, on Friday, to stop discharging, there
were 70 or 80 'tons of iron on the pier. Pier 39 was a well'built
pier, but the quantity of iron placed upon it,, and' the manner in
which' it was placed upon it, it being accumulated too much in one
spot, caused the disaster by which a portion of the iron was lost.
There is some contradictory evidence in regard to a portion of
the facts as above set forth, but the .preponderance of testimony is
such that there can be no reasonable doubt in regard to. any of
them.
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These facts being found, the next question is, what is the law on
the subject of the liabilities and responsibilities of common carriers
of goods for hire in a case of this kind; when they begin, how
long they continue, or when they cease; or when the carrier discharges himself of the custody of the goods in his character of
common carrier? These liabilities and responsibilities commence
when the goods are placed on board the carrying vessel; they continue during the voyage, and until the goods are safely delivered
to the consignee at.the port of discharge, or are placed in such a
situation at such port of discharge, as either by law or general
usage is equivalent to such delivery to the consignee, and until
they are either delivered to the consignee, or are plaged in such a
situation at the port of discharge, as is either by law or general
usage equivalent to such personal delivery, the carrier is not discharged of the custody and safety of the goods, but is responsible
for the same. It is claimed by the libelants that the iron, though
safely carried to the port of discharge, was not at such port either
safely delivered to them, or safely placed in such a situation as is,
either by law or general usage, equivalent to such personal delivery.
The law and general usage in this country in regard to foreign
voyages, or goods brought from a foreign country, seems now-to be
well settled, and appears to be this: that under a bill of lading in
the ordinary form, the carrier is not bound to make a personal delivery of the goods to the consignee; but it will be sufficient if he
lands themin a proper manner at the usual wharf or proper place
of landing, and gives due and reasonable notice thereof to the consignee. Such landing, with such notice, is equivalent to a personal
delivery to the consignee. (Angell & Ames on Carriers, sec. 310.
Such landing-place, in order to make it equivalent to a personal
delivery, must be a proper place for landing, and the landing miistbe made in a proper manner. No unsafe landing-place can bp a
proper landing-place, and no unsafe mode or way of landing can be
considered as a proper mode or way of landing the goods.
It has been sometimes claimed, when the question of the liability
of common. carriers has been presented before courts, that where
the consignee is not the owner of the goods, but is a third person,
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the rule is a little different and that in such a case -the carrier,
when there is no personal delivery, in order, to make his responsi;
bility cease, must not only land the goods in a proper place, and
give due and reasonable notice thereof to the consignee; but that
he must also, after tile goods are. unladen,.secure -them -byhousing
or otherwise, if no consignee appears, or if he neglects or refuses to
accept the -goods. The district judge of the Soutlisrn.Distriet-of
Ne.w York, when the case of-the ,Graftbn was before him, as appears
by the .report of the case in 1 Blatchford, Circuit VourtReports,
p. 175, decided,

'That

in a well settled course.-of trade, such M.

eoisted in New York) in. relation to coasting vessels, the delivery of
a cargo onthe dock, with notice to its owflr8 of the time and place
Qf unlading them, placed the cargo at' their risk, and discharged
the.vessel from liability, But that in case the cargo was addressed
to a mere consignee, 'the -vessel.would be uuder the further .obligation to secure- the, property,, after it was unladen, if-uo consignee
appeared, or if jirefuWed to accept the goods."
I
There are many-good and substantial reasons -whyothe-carrier
should be require 4 to do, more, where there - is no personal delivery
in the case, when the consignte is a third person, .than should be
required of him when the consignee is the owner of -the goods.
But waiving the :consideration of the question whether a different
rule .exists in the one case from what exists in the other, I would
consider this case as if the consignee were the owner of the goods.
The carrier may not be bound under a bill of lading in the ordinary form to unlade his cargo at the place selected by thie consignee. If, however, the carrier selects the place to land the
gopds, he must select a good and safe and proper place for landing
t! m. What would-be a:good and safe and proper place-for landone kind or quality or quantity of goods, would not be a good
and safe and -proper place for landing another kind or-quality or
quantity of goods. .Ias then, the carrier, in this case, done that
which is equivalent to a personal .delivery of the iron to the consignee? If hd has safely unladen it in a safe and proper place,
and in a safe and proper manner, and given due and reasonable
notice to the consignee, then he has. If he has not, then he is
-

-'
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liable for the damage which has been sustained by the loss of the
iron, occasioned by the breaking of the pier upon 'which it was by
the carrier placed.
On Friday, the 25th of June, at about 11 o'clock, A. m., about
seventy or eighty tQns of the iron had been, discharged and placed on
the pier. The assistant dockmaster, seeing that quantity on the
pier and the manner in which it was placed, and that those on
board were in the act of discharging more, and apprehending danger, notified the captain of the Majestic, not to discharge any more
on the pier. For a time those on board the vessel stopped discharging. In the afternoon of the same day, however, they recommenced, when the dockmaster, apprehending danger, ordered
them to stop.' On the, morning of Saturday, the 26th of June,
they continued to discharge the iron on the pier, up to about 11
o'clock, when about.150 tons of it having been placed on the pier,
the pier, from the weight of the iron upon it, broke down, ind the
iron was precipitated into the water, and a good'portion of it, about
fifty tons, was lost. The captain in his deposition says, that on
Saturday they continued to discharge until the pier fell. The captain was warned of the danger, but persisted in overloading the
pier, by which the pier broke. The pier was safe and proper for a
certain quantity of iron, but not safe and proper for 150 'tons
placed on it in the manner that this iron was placed. For the
quantity placed on the pier, in the manner in which it was placed,
it was not. safe, and therefore not a proper place. Of this thM captain was notified before the danger had been encountered. The
carrier, therefore, has not safely landed the iron in a proper and
safe place, and in a proper and safe manner for the quantity that
was discharged. He has not, therefore, done that which is equivalent to a persoxial delivery of the iroa to the consignee; for, to do
that, it is necessary that he should have landed it in a proper place,
a place proper for the amount that was landed. By his not complying with the stipulation contained in the bill of lading, to safely
discharge the iron in a proper place, the loss has happened, and he
must be answerable for the damage'which has been occasioned.
It is contended, however, by the-respondent, that the claim for

